

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 29492 01 OF 05 091740Z

42

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 NIC-01 ACDA-05

OMB-01 BIB-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00

EB-07 CU-02 SAJ-01 AEC-05 AECE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 FRB-01 NEA-06 COME-00 STR-01

FEAE-00 AGR-05 /102 W

----- 001993

Z P 091727Z DEC 74 ZFF 4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4966

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY

USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 29492 01 OF 05 091740Z

AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE
AMCONSUL NICE
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 29492

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, FR, UR
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV VISIT: FIRST IMPRESSIONS

REF: MOSCOW 18134 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: BREZHNEV SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING GOF'S HERETOFORE NON-COMMITTAL ATTITUDE TOWARD A CSCE SUMMIT, APPARENTLY WITHOUT THE SOVIETS MAKING ANY BINDING CONCESSIONS ON BASKET THREE ISSUES. BREZHNEV RETURNED TO MOSCOW PROBABLY SATISFIED WITH GISCARD'S PROMISES OF CONTINUITY WITH POMPIDOU/DE GAULLE FOREIGN POLICY, AND CLEARLY REASSURED AT THE EXTENT TO WHICH FRANCE IS PROVING WILLING AND ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN LARGE-SCALE, LONG-TERM ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE FRENCH SEEM PLEASED THAT GISCARD HAS REAFFIRMED THE "PRIVILEGED INTERLOCUTOR" STATUS WHICH POMPIDOU HAD WITH BREZHNEV. APART FROM CSCE, DISCUSSIONS ON MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO ROUTINE EXCHANGES, STRESSING LARGE CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS. BREZHNEV'S WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH PCF CHIEF MARCHAIS HELPED BOLSTER RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND ITS FRENCH COMMUNIST ALLIES, ALTHOUGH IT DID LITTLE TO HIDE THE FACT THAT THE PCF UNDER MARCHAIS HAS MOVED A SLIGHT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 29492 01 OF 05 091740Z

DISTANCE AWAY FROM ITS HISTORICALLY CLOSE ALIGNMENT WITH SOVIET POLICY. THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE SIGNED, WHILE BROAD IN SCOPE, ARE VAGUE ON SOME SPECIFICS AND CONTAIN NO SURPRISES. BREZHNEV'S HEALTH REMAINS A QUESTION MARK. GISCARD WILL MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE USSR IN 1975, PROBABLY AROUND SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER. END SUMMARY.

1. CSCE. CSCE, THE MIDDLE EAST AND BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES WERE THE MAJOR TOPICS, JUST AS THEY WERE FOR THE POMPIDOU-BREZHNEV MEETING LAST MARCH. CSCE APPARENTLY OCCUPIED A LARGE PART OF THE TETE-A-TETES. BREZHNEV OBVIOUSLY MADE A MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING GISCARD AROUND ON CSCE AND APPEARS TO HAVE LARGELY SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING THE GOF'S HERETOFORE NONCOMMITTAL ATTITUDE TOWARD A FINAL CSCE SUMMIT. IN GAINING GISCARD'S AGREEMENT ON A CSCE SUMMIT -- SOMETHING BREZHNEV WAS NEVER ABLE TO GET FROM POMPIDOU -- THE SOVIET LEADER DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE CONCEDED ANYTHING SUBSTANTIAL ON BASKET THREE ISSUES. WHILE HE MAY HAVE MADE SOME ORAL CONCESSIONS TO GISCARD IN RETURN FOR FRENCH AGREEMENT TO THE COMMUNIQUE WORDING (WE HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY CULTURAL CENTERS AND READING ROOMS -- THAT FRENCH IDEE FIXE AND SOVIET BETE NOIRE), SO FAR THE FRENCH SEEM TO HAVE GOTTEN LITTLE OR NOTHING DOWN ON PAPER. THUS AS VIEWED FROM HERE THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF CSCE REMAINS, IF NOT RIGID, CERTAINLY FIRM.

2. IN HIS DECEMBER 5 DINNER TOAST GISCARD POINTEDLY AVOIDED MENTIONING THE CSCE SUMMIT, WHILE BREZHNEV EMPHASIZED ITS URGENCY. MIDWAY THROUGH THE VISIT -- AND WELL BEFORE THE COMMUNIQUE RELEASE, AS IF TO DISPEL ANY DOUBTS IN ADVANCE ABOUT ITS MEANING -- SOVIET PRESS SPOKESMAN ZAMYATIN LET HIS BELIEF BE KNOWN THAT THE CSCE SUMMIT OF 35 WILL TAKE PLACE IN HELSINKI DURING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 29492 02 OF 05 091751Z

42

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 NIC-01 ACDA-05 OMB-01

BIB-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 EB-07 CU-02

SAJ-01 AEC-05 AECE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 SAM-01 FRB-01 NEA-06 COME-00 STR-01 FEAE-00

AGR-05 INRE-00 EURE-00 /102 W

----- 002147

Z P 091727Z DEC 74 ZFF 4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4967

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY

USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 29492 02 OF 05 091751Z

AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY

AMCONSUL BORDEAUX

AMCONSUL LYON

AMCONSUL MARSEILLE

AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE

AMCONSUL NICE

AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 PARIS 29492

FIRST HALF OF 1975. THIS HARDLY SQUARES WITH THE FRENCH
VIEW THAT NOTHING WILL BE FINALLY DECIDED UNTIL THE

SOVIETS MAKE KNOWN THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS.

3. ACCORDING TO USUALLY WELL INFORMED MONDE CORRESPONDENT MICHEL TATU, GISCARD AND BREZHNEV PERSONALLY WORKED OUT THE KEY PASSAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH CSCE. THE TEXT -- IN WHICH THE TWO PARTIES DECLARE THAT "FAVORABLE PREREQUISITES" ("DE BONNES PREMISSES") HAVE BEEN CREATED FOR THE RAPID CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE AND FOR HOLDING OF THE THIRD PHASE AND SIGNING OF FINAL DOCUMENTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL -- CONFIRMS THAT PARIS HAS SOFTENED ITS ATTITUDE. THE FRENCH SAY, OF COURSE, THAT THIS SENTENCE MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ONE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING IN WHICH FRANCE AND THE USSR AGREE TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD RESOLVING THE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS.

4. IN OTHER WORDS, THE FRENCH TAKE THE VIEW THAT THEIR POSITION IS A "YES, BUT" (TO USE GISCARD'S FAVORITE NUANCE), ACCEPTING THE IDEA OF A CSCE SUMMIT WHILE POSING CONDITIONS. YET THE COMMUNIQUE WORDING STRIKES US AS DISTINCTLY FAVORABLE TO THE SOVIET SIDE. GISCARD DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE GOTTEN ANY BINDING CONCESSIONS OUT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 29492 02 OF 05 091751Z

BREZHNEV ON CSCE ISSUES. AS ALWAYS, WE SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO WHAT THE SOVIETS DO THAN WHAT THEY SAY, AND THE NEXT FEW MONTHS AT GENEVA WILL PROVIDE THE REAL TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS ON BASKET THREE.

5. APART FROM A MORE ACCOMMODATING FRENCH POSITION ON CSCE, WE SEE NO SIGN OF A MEASURABLE SHIFT IN FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS. IF BREZHNEV WAS A LITTLE ANXIOUS WHEN HE ARRIVED, HE HAD EVERY REASON TO BE SATISFIED WHEN HE LEFT. HE MUST HAVE RETURNED TO MOSCOW PLEASED BY GISCARD'S GIVE ON CSCE AND BY THE WARM TONE OF THE MEETINGS, AND REASSURED THAT THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS THE SAME BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE USSR AS DID THE GOVERNMENTS OF DE GAULLE AND POMPIDOU.

6. THE VISIT SERVED TO BOLSTER GISCARD'S IMAGE AS HE TURNS THIS WEEK TO THE EC SUMMIT AND HIS MEETING IN MARTINIQUE WITH PRESIDENT FORD. BUT SOME OF THE PRESS COMMENTARY, E.G. IN THE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, CONTAINED MORE THAN A HINT THAT MOSCOW GOT THE BETTER OF THE EXCHANGE. THE FRENCH MEDIA GAVE BREZHNEV MODERATE COVERAGE, BUT THE FACT THAT HIS VISIT HAD TO COMPETE WITH OTHER CLOSELY FOLLOWING MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EVENTS RESULTED IN ITS GETTING LESS PRESS ATTENTION THAN ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED. AT ANY RATE, THE FRANCO-SOVIET SUMMIT WAS ONLY OF PASSING INTEREST TO A FRENCH PUBLIC

PREOCCUPIED WITH THE WORSENING ECONOMY, PERSISTING INFLATION, RISING UNEMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS UNCERTAINTY, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S SEEMING INABILITY TO DO MUCH ABOUT IT ALL.

7. MIDDLE EAST. THE FRENCH AGREED TO THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR A FINAL COMMUNIQUE. THE SOVIETS TRIED THEIR BEST TO TURN THE COMMUNIQUE INTO A MAJOR DOCUMENT, AND TRIED TO HEIGHTEN SUSPENSE BY DELAYING ITS RELEASE UNTIL BREZHNEV'S PLANE TOUCHED DOWN IN MOSCOW. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AS ON THE OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS APART FROM CSCE, DISCUSSION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO A ROUTINE EXCHANGE STRESSING A CLOSE CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS. THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAINS NO NEW ELEMENTS. AS EXPECTED, IT MAKES A POSITIVE REFER-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PARIS 29492 02 OF 05 091751Z

ENCE TO THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED CONCERNING THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE FRENCH SEEM TO HAVE RESISTED SOVIET PRESSURE TO CALL FOR THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE; THE COMMUNIQUE GOES ON TO REFER TO THE RIGHT OF ALL THE STATES OF THE REGION TO AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE WITH SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS. REGARDING THE COMMUNIQUE DEMAND FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM "ALL TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967," THE FRENCH INDICATE THAT THIS FORMULATION -- WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN USING FOR SOME TIME -- DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF MINOR BORDER ADJUSTMENTS. ALSO AS EXPECTED, BOTH SIDES CALLED FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONVENING OF A GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE.

8. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES: CYPRUS, INDOCHINA, DISARMAMENT. THE COMMUNIQUE NOTED THAT A DANGEROUS SITUATION PERSISTS ON CYPRUS AND CALLED FOR THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS AND THE RETURN OF ALL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 29492 03 OF 05 091754Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 NIC-01 ACDA-05

OMB-01 BIB-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 EB-07

CU-02 SAJ-01 AEC-05 AECE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03

H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 FRB-01 NEA-06 COME-00 STR-01

FEAE-00 AGR-05 INRE-00 /102 W

----- 002115

Z P 091727Z DEC 74 ZFF 4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4968

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY

USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 29492 03 OF 05 091754Z

AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY

AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE
AMCONSUL NICE
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 PARIS 29492

REFUGEES SAFE AND SOUND. ON INDOCHINA, IT CALLED FOR THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE PARIS ACCORDS, AND STRESSED THAT THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM MUST BE RESOLVED BY THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. THE TWO SIDES ALSO CITED AS THEIR OBJECTIVE A GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, WITH NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT, AND CALLED FOR THE CONVENING OF A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.

9. BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES. BREZHNEV AND GISCARD SIGNED A FIVE YEAR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT. ORIGINALLY IT HAD NOT BEEN PLANNED THAT THEY PERSONALLY WOULD SIGN; THIS WAS A LATE CHANGE IN PLANS AT SOVIET INSISTENCE. THIS AGREEMENT IS VAGUE AND MERELY STATES THAT THEY WILL COOPERATE TO AUGMENT EXCHANGES. IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE IT WAS STATED THAT TRADE IN THE PERIOD 1975-79 WOULD DOUBLE IN VALUE OVER THE PRECEDING FIVE YEAR PERIOD AND THAT AN EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO TRIPLE IT. THE OBJECTIVE OF BALANCED TRADE WAS ALSO STATED.

10. EXTERNAL TRADE MINISTER PATOLITCHEV AND FINANCE MINISTER FOURCADE SIGNED THREE ACCORDS:

A) A TEN YEAR INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 29492 03 OF 05 091754Z

SEVERAL SPECIFIC PROJECTS WERE MENTIONED AS OBJECTIVES BUT NO FIRM CONTRACTS OR AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A LARGE ALUMINUM PROJECT IN SIBERIA WHICH WOULD BE BUILT BY A CONSORTIUM OF PECHINEY AND UGINE-KUHLMAN. TOTAL COST IS ESTIMATED AT 6 BILLION FRANCS AND FRANCE WOULD PROVIDE CREDITS OF ABOUT 3 BILLION FRANCS.

B) A CREDIT AGREEMENT, EXACT TERMS UNKNOWN; TOTAL CREDITS REPORTEDLY 12.5 BILLION FRANCS OVER A 5-YEAR PERIOD AT RATES VARYING FROM 7.2 PERCENT FOR LARGE DEALS TO 7.55 PERCENT FOR SMALLER TRANSACTIONS. TOTAL CREDITS ARE APPROXIMATELY DOUBLE THOSE IN THE 1970-74 AGREEMENT.

C) THE USSR WILL DELIVER 2 BILLION CUBIC METERS OF GAS PER YEAR TO FRANCE BEGINNING IN 1976 AND THIS WILL RISE TO 4 BILLION CUBIC METERS PER YEAR BY 1980. AGREEMENT ON PRICE HAS APPARENTLY NOT YET BEEN REACHED.

11. CULTURAL RELATIONS. AT THE PITSUNDA SUMMIT LAST MARCH, BREZHNEV WAS SAID TO HAVE EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR A CULTURAL AGREEMENT, BUT POMPIDOU THEN GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF HAVING LITTLE INTEREST. HOWEVER, GISCARD'S REFERENCE TO CULTURAL AFFAIRS IN HIS DINNER TOAST DECEMBER 5 -- HE SAID THAT IN THE CULTURAL AREA, MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE AND THE TWO SIDES COULD GO FARTHER, CONTRASTING THIS TO WHAT HE CALLED THE RAPID AND EVEN SPECTACULAR DEVELOPMENT OF FRANCO-SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES -- SUGGESTS A SHIFT IN THE FRENCH POSITION, POSSIBLY REFLECTING GISCARD'S OWN DESIRE TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND THE OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THIS SEEMS BORNE OUT BY THE COMMUNIQUE REFERENCE TO THE DESIRE OF BOTH SIDES TO DEVELOP CULTURAL EXCHANGES, AND THE FACT THAT A PERMANENT FRANCO-SOVIET COMMISSION WILL MEET IN PARIS DECEMBER 11-12 TO WORK OUT A CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR 1975-76.

12. ANOTHER LINE IN GISCARD'S DINNER TOAST AGAIN DREW ATTENTION -- PERHAPS UNINTENTIONALLY -- TO THE PRESIDENT'S UNCONVENTIONAL NIGHT LIFE, AS VGE REVEALED THAT THESE DAYS HE HAS FORMED THE HABIT OF ENDING EACH CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PARIS 29492 03 OF 05 091754Z

EVENING BY READING A LITTLE FROM TOLSTOY'S WAR AND PEACE.

13. SOVIET-PCF RELATIONS AND THE MARCHAIS MEETING. SOVIET LEADERS VISITING FRANCE HAVE TRADITIONALLY MET WITH FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF) LEADERS. BREZHNEV'S WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH PCF SECRETARY GENERAL GEORGES MARCHAIS DECEMBER 6, BEFORE AND DURING A "FRATERNAL" DINNER AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY, SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY DESIGNED AS A HIGHLY VISIBLE BOLSTERING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND ITS PCF ALLIES -- BEYOND WHAT A PRIVATE MEETING WOULD HAVE DONE. IT ALSO IS IN KEEPING WITH MARCHAIS' RECENT EFFORTS TO GIVE THE PCF A MORE "OPEN" LOOK.

14. THE MEETING, HOWEVER, DID LITTLE TO HIDE THE FACT THAT THE PCF UNDER MARCHAIS HAS MOVED A SLIGHT DISTANCE AWAY FROM ITS HISTORICALLY CLOSE ALIGNMENT WITH SOVIET

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 29492 04 OF 05 091803Z

42

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 NIC-01 ACDA-05

OMB-01 BIB-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 EB-07

CU-02 SAJ-01 AEC-05 AECE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03

H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 FRB-01 NEA-06 COME-00 STR-01

FEAE-00 AGR-05 INRE-00 /102 W

----- 002294

Z P 091727Z DEC 74 ZFF 4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4969

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY

USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 29492 04 OF 05 091803Z

AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE
AMCONSUL NICE
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 PARIS 29492

POLICY. CONSPICUOUSLY MISSING FROM MARCHAIS' DECLARATION TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING THE MEETING WERE ANY OF THE FORMERLY NEAR-MANDATORY REFERENCES TO COMMON POSITIONS. MARCHAIS WAS CAREFUL TO STRESS THE DECISIONS TAKEN -- PRESUMABLY INDEPENDENTLY -- BY "OUR PARTY," TO ACCENTUATE THE FACT THAT THE PCF CHAIRMAN HAD "INFORMED" THE CPSU SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PCF'S POSITIONS. MARCHAIS ENDED HIS STATEMENT BY NOTING THAT "...BETWEEN OUR TWO PARTIES STRUGGLING UNDER VERY DIFFERENT CONDITIONS AND DETERMINING IN A SOVEREIGN MANNER THEIR LINE, THEIR OBJECTIVES AND THEIR METHODS, THERE EXISTS AN EXCELLENT RAPPORT OF SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION." THE TONE THROUGHOUT HIS STATEMENT WAS COOL, UNDERSCORING THE FACT THAT MARCHAIS HAD CLEARLY MET WITH BREZHNEV ON AN EQUAL FOOTING RATHER THAN AS A PARTY LEADER WHO PAYS FIEF TO THE HEAD OF HIS INTERNATIONAL.

15. INTERIOR MINISTER PONIATOWSKI DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN GISCARD'S DECEMBER 5 DINNER FOR BREZHNEV, EVEN THOUGH HE RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO ALGERIA EARLIER THAT DAY IN PLENTY OF TIME, AND EVEN THOUGH THE GUEST LIST OF 23 INCLUDED HEALTH MINISTER SIMONE VEIL -- A LOWER-RANKING CABINET MEMBER. RECOGNIZING MOSCOW'S DISLIKE OF PONIATOWSKI, GISCARD OBVIOUSLY DID NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS HIM.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 29492 04 OF 05 091803Z

RASS HIS VISITORS, STILL ANNOYED AFTER PONIATOWSKI'S

OUTBURSTS AGAINST THE COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH PRAVDA HAD EARLIER CHARACTERIZED AS SLANDEROUS AND UNFRIENDLY. THUS THE PONIATOWSKI/DUCLOS IMBROGLIO REMAINED BURIED AND DID NOT DISTURB THE CORDIAL SUMMIT ATMOSPHERE.

16. IN SPECULATING ON WHETHER THE SOVIETS MAY BE CONSIDERING A REVERSAL OF THEIR UNITED FRONT POLICY IN FRANCE (REFTEL), A KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER MOSCOW BELIEVES THAT GISCARD WILL BE FORCED TO CALL LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WELL BEFORE THE SPRING 1978 DATE. IF SO, THEN THE ARGUMENTS DEVELOPED IN PARAGRAPH NINE OF REFTEL SEEM TO US MORE CREDIBLE (ALTHOUGH WE ARE INCLINED TO QUESTION IN ANY CASE THE THIRD REASON GIVEN FOR MOSCOW'S POSSIBLE CHANGE OF POSITION -- ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES DRIVING THE SOVIETS TO PREFER DEALING WITH THE CAPITALIST GOVERNMENT IN POWER IN FRANCE; ON THE CONTRARY, WITH PCF PARTICIPATION IN SOME OF THE FRENCH TECHNICAL MINISTRIES, THE SOVIETS MIGHT GET A BETTER DEAL ECONOMICALLY OUT OF THE GOF, ESPECIALLY ON ISSUES OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER).

17. BUT IF THE SOVIETS -- LIKE US -- ARE UNSURE WHETHER GISCARD'S PARLIAMENT WILL RUN ITS FULL COURSE, WE BELIEVE THEY WILL THINK TWICE BEFORE RISKING AN UPSETTING OF THE DELICATE INTERNAL POLITICAL BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN FRENCH LEFT AND RIGHT THAT WOULD BE CAUSED BY A SUDDEN, MOSCOW-INDUCED PCF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNITED LEFT. CLEARLY THE AGING SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD PREFER TO DEAL WITH A COMPARATIVELY STABLE FRANCE THAN ONE IN DISARRAY -- JUST AS THEY PREFERRED GISCARD OVER MITTERRAND FOR PRESIDENT. WITH THE NEXT FRENCH ELECTIONS PROBABLY FAR DOWN THE ROAD, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS FOR THE TIME BEING WILL BE INCLINED TO KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN -- AND WILL KEEP THE KREMLIN THUMB OUT OF THE FRENCH POLITICAL PIE.

18. A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF SOVIET VIEWS OF THE UNITED LEFT MAY BE TAKEN FROM PCF ATTENDANCE AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY DINNER. ROLAND LEROY (NEWLY-NAMED HUMANITE EDITOR), GASTON PLISSONIER, JEAN KANAPA AND CHARLES CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PARIS 29492 04 OF 05 091803Z

FITERMANN ARE ALL KNOWN TO BE AT LEAST MILDLY DISAPPROVING OF MARCHAIS' POLICY OF ALLIANCE WITH THE SOCIALISTS. MISSING FROM THE GUEST LIST WERE ANY OF MARCHAIS' MAJOR PCF ARCHITECTS OF THE UNITED LEFT (PAUL LAURENT, ETIENNE FAJON), AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEIR ABSENCE REPRESENTS A DEFERENCE TO KNOWN OR FEARED SOVIET PREFERENCE.

19. BREZHNEV'S HEALTH STILL A QUESTION. SEVERAL

ALTERATIONS IN THE PROGRAM, LATE STARTING OF SEVERAL MEETINGS, AND IN PARTICULAR BREZHNEV'S NON-ATTENDANCE AT GISCARD'S DECEMBER 6 LUNCHEON, LED INEVITABLY TO FURTHER SPECULATION ABOUT BREZHNEV'S HEALTH. ROLAND FAURE IN CONSERVATIVE AURORE CLAIMED THAT IT WAS NO LONGER A SECRET THAT BREZHNEV INTENDS TO STEP DOWN IN A YEAR, AND SAW THIS AS EXPLAINING SOVIET INSISTENCE ON A BRILLIANT SUMMIT CONCLUSION FOR CSCE. WHILE THIS KIND OF SPECULATION WAS SHARPLY DENOUNCED BY SOVIET PRESS SPOKESMAN ZAMYATIN, IT IS A FACT THAT BREZHNEV'S SCHEDULE WAS DELIBERATELY LIGHTENED ON DECEMBER 6:

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 29492 05 OF 05 091805Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 NIC-01 ACDA-05 OMB-01

BIB-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 EB-07 CU-02

SAJ-01 AEC-05 AECE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 SAM-01 FRB-01 NEA-06 COME-00 STR-01 FEAE-00

AGR-05 INRE-00 /102 W

----- 002266

Z P 091727Z DEC 74 ZFF 4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4970

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 29492 05 OF 05 091805Z

AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE
AMCONSUL NICE
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 PARIS 29492

-- THE STARTING OF THE MORNING TETE-A-TETE WAS
MOVED BACK AN HOUR AND A HALF, APPARENTLY TO
GIVE BREZHNEV MORE TIME TO REST;
-- BREZHNEV (ALONG WITH GROMYKO) DID NOT ATTEND
GISCARD'S LUNCH;
-- TO OBSERVERS AT THE EARLY AFTERNOON SIGNING
CEREMONY FOR THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREE-
MENT, BREZHNEV APPEARED TIRED AND NOT IN TOP
FORM;
-- THE AFTERNOON VISIT TO THE EXPOSITION AT THE
GRAND PALAIS COMMEMORATING THE 50TH ANNIVER-
SARY OF FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS WAS CANCELED;
BREZHNEV THUS HAD NO SCHEDULED APPEARANCES OR
APPOINTMENTS FROM ROUGHLY 3 TO 7 P.M., WHEN
HE LEFT FOR THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND HIS MEETING
WITH MARCHAIS.

ACCORDING TO JOURNALISTS, BREZHNEV SHOWED SIGNS OF
FATIGUE AFTER THE TETE-A-TETES, AND GENERALLY DID NOT

SPARKLE IN HIS TV APPEARANCES. DURING TV COVERAGE OF HIS DEPARTURE, HE LOOKED FAIRLY VIGOROUS BUT HIS SPEECH SEEMED MORE SLURRED THAN USUAL. IT MAY BE, OF COURSE, THAT HE IS MERELY WEARY FROM HIS RECENT HEAVY SCHEDULE-- INCLUDING A MAJOR VISIT TO MONGOLIA AND THE VLADIVOS-TOK SUMMIT -- WHICH CAN TAKE ITS TOLL ON ANY MAN OF 68.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 29492 05 OF 05 091805Z

20. DEMONSTRATIONS FAIL TO MAR VISIT. SEVERAL VERY SMALL DEMONSTRATIONS BY ANTI-SOVIET GROUPS PRESSING THE USSR TO RELAX CONTROLS OVER JEWISH EMIGRATION WERE FIRMLY CONTAINED BY FRENCH POLICE AND DID NOT INTERFERE WITH BREZHNEV'S VISIT.

21. GISCARD TO VISIT USSR. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIQUE DID NOT SPECIFY A DATE FOR GISCARD'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE USSR, THE PRESIDENT TOLD NEWSMEN AT THE AIRPORT FOR BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE THAT HE WILL MAKE THE VISIT NEXT FALL. BEST GUESS IS AROUND SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER.

22. IN THE COMING DAYS WE WILL BE SEEING GOF OFFICIALS AND WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON THEIR VIEWS OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT.
RUSH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, CHIEF OF STATE VISITS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974PARIS29492
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740356-0926
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741250/aaaabqph.tel
Line Count: 792
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: MOSCOW 18134 (NOTAL)
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BREZHNEV VISIT: FIRST IMPRESSIONS
TAGS: PFOR, FR, UR, (GISCARD D'ESTAING, VALERY), (BREZHNEV, LEONID I)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005